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   Linking marketing choices with farming practices of grain producers: 




With  the  increasing  commodity  prices  volatility  over  the  last  years  and  the  successive 
agricultural  policy  reforms,  European  grain  producers  face  greater  uncertainty.  To  better 
understand consequences of a price risk increase on production decisions, marketing decisions 
and farm revenue as well as linkage between production and marketing decisions, we develop 
a multiperiodic risk farm model. Production decisions concern selections of crop mix and 
farming practices (conventional or integrated farming) while marketing decisions focus on 
four  types  of  pricing  arrangements.  The  model  is  applied  to  a  representative  farmer  of  a 
region located in the Southwest of France. The results exposed in this paper shows that with a 
price risk increase, production adjustments of a risk averse farmer are oriented toward less 
risky  (environmentally  friendly)  farming  practices  unless  marketing  contracts  allow  to 
mitigate price risk.  
Key words: multiperiod farm model; marketing contracts; risk; Common Agricultural Policy. 
 
   1.  Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been subject to successive reforms over the last 
twenty years. These reforms have led to a step-wise reduction of grain price support. While 
the price support system was initially offset by  an increase in direct  (coupled) payments, 
independent of the production level, these payments are now gradually substituted for Single 
Farm Payments (SFP), independent of the level of production as well as crop mix. One of the 
underlying  objectives  behind  these  changes  is  to  give  an  incentive  to  European  grain 
producers to take more market-based oriented decisions, so as to allow a better economic 
efficiency of the overall European Union (EU) agricultural subsidies. Together with rising 
world prices for commodities (Voituriez, 2009), these reforms have led to expose farmers to 
volatile commodity prices. As such, farmers experience a greater difficulty in forming price 
expectations.  
To cope with this greater ex ante price uncertainty, farmers can adopt risk-sharing instruments 
specific  to  this  source  of  risk  which  are  (revenue)  insurances  and  marketing  strategies 
(Harmignie et al., 2004). Among these tools, revenue insurance instruments are currently not 
available to EU farmers. This can be explained by the fact that the risk linked to market price 
changes is a systemic risk which is hardly insurable without large government subsidizing of 
the premium. Until now, there is no EU program subsidizing such revenue insurance for 
farmers. In this setting, marketing strategies selected by farmers become critical to deal with 
an increasing price risk
1. Nevertheless, farmers can also use on-farm price risk management 
strategies composed of production adjustments. Moreover, given the fact that the riskiness of 
the farm enterprise is affected by marketing strategy itself, one would expect that marketing 
contracts used by a farmer have an incidence on the production side of his farm. Thus, one 
would expect relationship between marketing strategies and production adjustments.  
The purpose of the paper is to examine marketing strategies and production adjustments of 
farmers  in  response  to  an  increasing  of  the  agricultural  prices  volatility  as  well  as  the 
relationship  between  marketing  strategies  and  production  adjustments.  We  built  a 
multiperiodic  risk  farm  model  using  non-linear  programming  method  to  simultaneously 
analyze marketing and technical decisions with respect to the whole farm constraints. The 
model includes factors likely to influence these decisions such as the level of yield and price 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that pricing arrangements and other types of coordination throughout the agri-food sector, 
particularly  between  cooperatives  and  farmers,  are  deeply  changing.  In  France,  we  observe  cooperatives 
updating and seeking to improve grain marketing alternatives proposed to their members in order to be closer to 
the diversity of the new farmer marketing demands. risk, degree of risk aversion, liquidity and credit constraints, CAP instruments and farmer’s 
expectations in terms of correlation between crop yields and prices. 
The  following  section  of  the  paper  is  dedicated  to  a  brief  literature  review  on  farmer’s 
marketing decisions (section 2). Next, we present the general structure, activities, contracts 
and constraints of the multiperiodic mathematical programming model (section 3). We then 
describe the data used for the applied analysis and explain the procedure selected to introduce 
risk in the model is explained (section 4). Finally, we present results from the simulation. The 
paper ends with a discussion on results and futures simulations since it is a work in progress.  
2.  Literature review 
While  alternative  marketing  strategies  are  potentially  large,  they  can  be  grouped  in  three 
groups (Tomek and Peterson, 2001): spot market strategies (harvest-time sales or post-harvest 
marketing  of  grain  for  diversification  of  selling  time);  forward  (marketing)  contracts; 
standardized  contracts  such  as  futures  and  options  on  derivatives  markets.  The  two  last 
categories of marketing strategies, which are pre-harvest marketing strategies, are considered 
as hedging strategies.  
Theoretical models have been devoted to explain the relevance of hedging for risk averse 
farmers. These hedging models can be distinguished according to the modeling approaches 
and assumptions (Coad, 2001). Some models are based on the risk minimization criterion 
(e.g., Johnson, 1960; Lence and Hayes, 1994) while others are based on profit maximization 
(Brorsen, 1995), mean-variance criterion (McKinnon, 1967; Lapan and Moschini, 1994) or 
expected  utility  maximization  (e.g.,  Stein,  1961;  Bond  and  Thompson,  1985;  Park  and 
Antonovitz, 1990). Although these models differ in assumptions (e.g., correlation between 
price and production, farmer’s risk attitude, source(s) of agricultural risk, basis risk, level of 
transaction  costs)  they  show  that  risk-averse  farmers  can  benefit  of  large  potential  risk 
reduction from hedging (Tomek and Peterson, 2001). Nevertheless, surveys on use by farmers 
of cash forward contracting, futures or options show that few farmers actually use such price 
risk management tools (e.g., Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994; Musser et al., 1996; Blank et al. 
1997; Collins, 1997; Patrick et al., 1998; Jordaan and Grové, 2007). These evidences appear 
to contradict literature on optimal hedging (Collins, 1997; Carter, 1999). Yet, there have been 
several studies intending to propose reasons explaining the gap between the predicted optimal 
hedging ratios by the majority of analytical models and the actual hedging ratios used by the 
producers. The potential factors identified are biased price expectations (Lapan et al., 1991), optimistic  attitudes  (Tuthill  and  Frechette,  2004),  basis  risk  (Lapan  and  Moschini,  1994), 
production risk which involves the additional risk when contracting impose for farmer to 
purchase grains to fulfill delivery obligations (Lapan and Moschini, 1994), transaction costs 
(Kahl, 1983), business size (Makus et al., 1990), lack of knowledge on how futures markets 
work  (Hardaker  et  al.,  2004),  socio-demographics  factors  such  as  education,  wealth  and 
business size (e.g., Velandia et al., 2009), debt-to-asset ratio (Katchova and Miranda, 2004), 
income support programs (Coble et al., 2004; Woolverton and Sykuta, 2009) and, finally, 
expected gain to the producer from hedging (Pannell et al., 2008). 
If we better understand why hedging strategies are not used as predicted and if theoretical 
models explain the impact of hedging on production level (Holthausen, 1979; Feder et al., 
1980), to the author’s knowledge, there are less applied studies on the impact of marketing 
strategies on production choices.  
Furthermore, here, we characterize marketing contracts by a specific expected price, a price 
risk content but also by one (or several) period(s) of payment. Thus, the adoption of a specific 
marketing  strategy  is  not  only  influenced  by  riskiness,  risk  aversion  and  potential  price 
enhancement but also by the cash flow constraint. 
 
3.  The farm model 
The non-sequential mathematical programming model of a representative farmer is depicted 
over a planning horizon of two years N={1,..,n} where n=2, subdivided in p monthly periods 
indexed by P= {1,…,p} where p=12. The decisions are taken in first period for the whole 
horizon. 
3.1 Crop production management 
Crop activities C={1,…,c}  introduced in the model can be grown on different types of land 
indexed by Z={1,…,z} distinguished according to soil structure characteristics and possibility 
of irrigation (equipment available). Furthermore, each crop can be grown applying different 
farming practices (T={1,…,t}). Crop activities are also depicted by specific premiums per 
cereal  area  (Arable  Area  Payments).  Then,  the  resulting  two-year  crop  mix  consists  in 
allocating,  across  each  zone,  a  crop  and  a  crop-specific  farming  practice.  There  is  one 
structural constraint and one agronomic constraint: Land resource: we consider a fixed representative farm size with a limited endowment of land 
for each land type. 
Crop rotation constraint: cropping successions are taken into account with bounded share of 
crop acreage.  
3.2 Marketing strategies 
Once the farmer allocate the land across crop activities, stochastic output quantities harvested 
need to be sold through one or more of the sale agreements. The model takes three dimension 
of a marketing arrangement into consideration: an average price, a risk content and date(s) of 
payment. Contractual choices are then influenced by price enhancement, risk and cash flow 
considerations. The pre-harvest contract such as forward contract binds the farmer to deliver a 
specified quantity of grain at a future date. Because the cooperative could sue for damages if 
the farmer, for whatever reason, fails to deliver the contracted tons, there is a delivery risk. 
We decided to model contractual choices so that they occur after the harvest yield state of the 
nature. These yield-contingent contractual choices imply that delivery risk is not taken into 
account. Interviews with cooperative employees responsible for marketing contract affirmed 
that the delivery fail is very rare because farmer are used to hedge as a maximum on half of 
their production. Then, it is possible to add such a constraint. We will discuss here about the 
most four marketing opportunities (K) proposed across the studied area and which have been 
introduced in the model.  
The first contract, the cooperative’s traditional one, denoted K1, requires that the producer 
delivers grain at harvest, where he is paid an average sale price per quarter. This pricing 
arrangement allows the farmer to bear only the inter-annual price risk since the intra-annual 
price volatility is smoothed thanks to the regular sales realized by the cooperative all along the 
sales campaign (time diversification). Payments are quarterly. 
The cash at harvest is the K2 contract. This cash sale strategy assumes that the manager sells 
the crop at harvest for the prevailing spot price. The farmer bears the entire responsibility for 
the intra-annual price risk. Payment occurs one month after the delivery/harvest. 
The  third  contractual  arrangement  (K3)  is  forward  contract.  A  fixed  price  contract  for 
deferred delivery allows hedging of the products since the farmer does not faces price risk. 
The use of forward strategies has an implicit opportunity cost due to the fact that the farmer as 
to forego any favorable price changes before delivery (Sykuta and Parcell, 2003). He also bears a hedging cost asked by the cooperative
2. The model allows these hedging costs to vary 
in order to study the impact of such costs on hedging decision. Payments are made one month 
after the contract commitment. That means that forward arrangement has a positive effect for 
a risk averse farmer but also for a famer with a binding financial constraint. The model does 
not account for derivatives but the aim is to focus on marketing arrangements proposed by 
cooperatives of the study area and not to detail different financial products. In addition, a farm 
survey lead in 2009 among 170 crop producers of the study area has shown that very few 
farmers actually use futures markets. This observation is consistent with much of the survey 
published. The attractiveness of forward contracting over futures markets suggests that many 
farmers believe that forward contracting has a more favorable benefit-to-cost ratio (Tomek 
and Peterson, 2000).  
In the model, farmer can decide to lock-in a crop price at two different periods: either three 
months before the harvest (K3A) or one month before harvest (K3B). These two possibilities 
of hedging periods are the most common among the 170 farmers surveyed having stated that 
they have already used forward contracts. 
The fourth pricing arrangement is post-harvest marketing strategy. This corresponds to grain 
storage. Even if farmers can invest in grain silos to store the harvested quantities, we only 
consider the more flexible strategy which is to store quantities in the grain collector’ silos. 
Storage costs were assumed at commercial rates. To reduce the model size, we also limited 
the sales at two periods. The first period is 4 month after harvest (K4A) and the second is 7 
month after harvest (K4B). We also used answers from the farm surveys to decide the timing 
between  harvest  and  post-harvest  sales.  Table  1  display  the  method  used  to  compute  the 
average crop price for each contract and its standard deviation. 
To  model  contractual  alternatives  in  the  multiperiodic  model,  we  introduce  annual  and 
periodic constraints. First, the total grain harvested must be sold over the year through one 
contract type at least (eq. 1).  
∑ "      , , , ,    ∑   , ,          , , , ,   ,   ,                                                           (eq. 1) 
SalesC,N,P,K,F : quantity of crop C sold in year N at the period P under contract K and at the state of nature of 
crop yield F (F is the set for states of nature of crop yields) (contractual choices) 
XC,T,Z: area allocated to the different crop activities (productive choices) 
YIELDC,T,Z,N,P,F : stochastic crop yield  
 
                                                 
2 Such costs could also partly reflect payment of a risk premium to speculators or forward buyers as reward for 
their acceptance of greater risk. In addition, for each contract, the product value per contract K is computed (eq. 2). Because 
dates of payments are different among contract, the set of equations is indexed on each period 
P. The product value depends also on the state of nature E={1,…,e} for the prices. The total 
product value per period is given by the sum over the partial product value of each contract 
(eq. 3). Further 
    , , , , ,          , , , ,          , ,   , ,                                                               (eq. 2) 
       , , , ,    ∑     , , , , ,                                                                                       (eq. 3) 
 
ValK,C,N,P,E,F: value of the sales for each contract K 
TotValC,N,P,E,F: total value of the sales 
PriceC,N,P,K,E: stochastic crop prices 
Another set of dynamic equations ensures that the stock of grain available at the end of a 
period is transferred at the beginning of the following period (eq. 4). Crop products stored 
constitute the maximal quantities available to the farmer which can be sold under K4A and 
K4B contracts (eq. 5). 
      , , ,          , ,   ,    ∑   , ,          , , , ,   ,    ∑       , ,   , ,     ,    (eq. 4) 
      , , ,     ,          , , ,     ,          , , ,                                                         (eq. 5) 
 
StockC,N,P,F:quantity of crop product stored 
The last important set of equations relates to the liquidity constraint allowing the introduction 
of a short-term financing (eq. 6), with a credit constraint (eq. 7). Short-term financing allows 
for  supplementing  cash  flow  each  year  for  operating  expenses  and  requires  principal  and 
interest repayments at the end of each year (eq. 8). 
 
     , , ,         ,   , ,    ∑    , ,        , , ,      ∑       , ,   ,       , , 
  _     ,             ,      ∑   , ,        ,                     , ,   , ,     , , 
      , ,   , ,           (eq. 6) 
∑        ,    max _                                                                                               (eq. 7) 
              ∑        ,         1                                                                          (eq. 8) 
 CashN,P,E,F: cash flow level 
BorrowN,P: short-term borrowing 
RepaymentsN: total repayments 
VCC,N,T,P: Variable Cost 
St_costC,P: storage cost 
AAPC,P-1: Arable Area Payments 
SFP: Single Farm Payment 
Max_borrow: borrowing capacity 
i: interest rate  
Economic  theory  suggests  that  hedging  play  a  role  to  reduce  the  market  risk  but  also  to 
increase the farmer’s capacity to borrow (Harris and Baker, 1981). Nevertheless, due to the 
fact that no data was available to test this hypothesis, the borrowing capacity has not been 
considered as an endogenous variable.  
3.3 The farmer’s decision problem 
Endogenous dynamic decision variables are related to production, marketing and short-term 
financing. The productive decision problem of the farmer consists to select, across each land 
type,  a  combination  of  crop,  using  one  or  several  farming  practices  under  biological  and 
agronomic constraints (crop rotation constraints), structural and economic constraints (land 
constraints  and  liquidity  constraints).  Short-term  financing  decision  is  the  second  type  of 
decision and depends on liquidity and credit constraints. The third important decision of the 
farmer is to select, conditionally to states of nature of yield, a set of marketing contracts to sell 
the harvested products. 
The producer makes choices so as to maximize a discounted expected utility of the stochastic 
net profit. Here, the net profit can be defined as the difference between the stochastic total 
income and the determinist total costs. The total income is composed of the total value of 
outputs plus first pillar direct supports from the CAP (arable area payments (AAP) and single 
farm payment (SFP)). Here, we assume that all the hectares are eligible to SFP so that the 
number of payment entitlements equals the sum of land types. Costs are divided between 
variable costs, a fixed cost per year, storage costs and credit costs. Variable costs encompass 
grain  and  chemical  inputs  purchases  as  well  as  labour  and  mechanization  costs  for  the 
different farming operations (tillage, sowing, fertilization, …, harvest). 
The  discounted  expected  utility  function  allows  taking  into  consideration  risk  and  time 
preferences (eq. 10). The first is related to the intra-temporal variability of the outcomes while 
the second is related to the fact that to have in one’s possession a certain amount of money 
now brought more utility than holding the same certain amount later on. The power functional form of the utility has been selected for the suitable risk preference structure that it implies. 
This form represents a farmer who exhibits a Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) 
and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). DARA assumption is supported by empirical 
evidence (Chavas and Holt, 1990) but there is no evidence on the sign of the variation of the 
coefficient  of  the  relative  risk  aversion  when  wealth  increases.  Then,  CRRA  assumption 
seems an acceptable compromise (Havlik et al. 2005). 
 
    ∑   
 
    
   
∑  
 
             ,   ,                                                                         (eq. 10) 
 
W: discounted expected utility function (objective function) 
Y: stochastic net profit 
1/(1+δ): discount factor 
r: coefficient of relative risk aversion 
πE,F: joint probability of allowed combination of states of nature E and F 
 
Risk programming for assessing alternative farm management strategies requires reasonable 
representation of risk aversion, but also robust inclusion of activities’ riskiness. The procedure 
used to introduce risky events is presented with data in the following section. 
4.  Empirical analysis and data 
4.1 Area study and farm types 
The different marketing alternatives are assessed on typical cash crop farms of the Midi-
Pyrénées region in the southwest of France. This region accounts for 26 per cent and 27 per 
cent for respectively French production of durum wheat and sunflower (AGRESTE, 2007). 
No futures markets for these crops are available to farmers. In that context, forward contracts 
issued by cooperatives are the only tools available to hedge a part of their production. 
A  typology  of  large  arable  farms  based  on  Data  from  Farm  Accountancy  Data  Network 
(FADN) was used. The typology distinguishes farms on land resource quantities and qualities 
and share of irrigated area density. Among the three cash crops farm types, we select the one 
with the intermediate characteristics in term of land size and irrigation density. The land size 
of the simulated representative farm is 100 ha with three land types. 24 ha are on irrigated 
land located in an alluvial corridor, 70 ha are on clay-muddy soil and 6 ha on sandy-clay soil.  4.2 data and procedure to simulate multivariate normal probability distribution 
Data for input-output coefficients: 
The six main crops of the studied area are proposed in the farm model: soft wheat, durum 
wheat, dry corn, irrigated corn, sunflower and rapeseed. Irrigated lands can only be allocated 
with irrigated corn. Dry corn can be cultivated only on clay-muddy soils. The other crops can 
be grown on any of the two dry land types. We introduce two farming practice, an intensive 
practice and an integrated practice.  
Variables costs, average crop yields and standard deviation of the crop yields differ across 
land  types  and  farming  practices.  Integrated  farming  practices  are  characterized  by  lower 
overall  variable  costs  (lower  chemical  input  costs  are  not  fully  compensated  by  larger 
mechanization and labour costs during the different farming operations), same or lower yields 
and higher yield’s variability than the intensive technique (Table 2 in appendix). Cost and 
return data for crop activities were obtained from regional references of year 2007 provided 
by the regional extension service (Chambre Régionale d’Agriculture).  
It is important to notice that we include labour costs in the variables costs but we did not 
introduce a set of labour constraints in the model. Even if it has been shown in a previous 
study that labour management can retrain the adoption of new farm practice in the studied 
area  (Ben  Elghali  et  al.,  2009),  this  oversight  leads  to  intentionally  overestimate  the 
attractiveness of integrated technique which is justified by the fact that one of the objective of 
the present study is to assess the specific effect of detailed marketing opportunities on the 
farming practices adoption. 
Data for risk assessment: 
In order to introduce risk into the model, we used time-series observations of regional average 
yields  (1975-2008)  and  national  monthly  product  prices  (1993-2008
3).  To  ensure  that 
historical intra- and inter-temporal stochastic correlations between all random variables (crop 
yields and contract-specific product prices) are maintained in the model, we used a procedure 
inspired by Richardson et al. (2000) for correlating random variables in a computer simulation 
using information from the covariance matrix
4.  
                                                 
3  derived  respectively  from  the  regional  agricultural  statistics  service  (AGRESTE)  and  from  the  public 
agricultural service responsible for price registration (FranceAgriMer). 
4 The difference with procedure of Richardson et al. (2000) holds on the fact that we assumed multivariate 
normal probability distribution instead of a multivariate empirical probability distribution. We used the 1993-2008 time-series to compute an average price and standard deviation for 
each contract. However, it was decided to deliberately leave out observations related to the 
commodity price peak from 2007 to 2008. By ignoring these observations, we preferred to 
keep away from important standard deviation values and to simulate increasing volatility with 
sensitivity analysis. 
We estimate parameters and simulate the multivariate normal distribution from de-trended 
yield and price series to correct respectively from technical progress and inflation. Monte-
Carlo sampling
5 was used to generate 20 states of nature
6 for the 26 random variables (K3 
hedging contracts was not include in the procedure since there is only one state of nature). 
The  states  of  nature  are  assumed  to  have  the  same  probability  of  occurrence.  The  whole 
simulated set is not presented here but we display the average and standard deviation of the 6 
crop yields (table 2) and the same information for the crop price in the simulated first year 
(table 3). Average yields of the second simulated year are slightly different from the first year 
due to the trend (not shown in the table). 
As seen previously, we distinguish state of nature of yield (F={1,…,20}) from state of nature 
for price (E={1,…,20}). It allows determining yield-contingent contractual choice, but also to 
possibly account for two types of farmer’s price expectation. First, farmer aware of historical 
(negative) correlation between yield and price (the state of nature Ei can only appears with the 
state of nature Fi) and farmer that do not perceive any correlation (the state of nature Ei can 
appear  with  any  states  of  nature  Fj          1,…,20 ).  With  the  first  type  expectation,  it 
becomes possible to investigate the actual role of natural hedging on farmer’s decisions and 
revenue. 
5.  Results and discussion 
5.1 case 1: results with a unique marketing contract opportunity 
In  the  first  set  of  simulation,  we  introduce  only  the  cash  at  harvest  contract  (K2).  The 
presence of this unique contract corresponds to a situation where the farmer cannot manage 
price risk thanks to a specific marketing strategy. For different level of risk aversion, we 
display  the  expected  discounted  profit,  the  total  areas  dedicated  respectively  to  the 
                                                 
5 To perform simulation,  we  used PopTools, a free add-ins for PC versions of Microsoft Excel. The Latin 
Hypercube sampling is not available so that we have to use instead a Monte-Carlo sampling. 
6 We first simulate 50 states of nature. However, when we insert the data into the model, the time to run the 
model was about 1 hour. We decide to reduce the number of states of nature introduced in the programming 
model to 20 after having checked that solutions were similar to ones with 50 states of nature.  conventional and the integrated farming practices, the simulated conversion rate (SCR) and 
the optimal cropping plan (table 4). The SCR is the ratio of land cultivated using integrated 
farming practices over total cultivated land. We also simulate commodity prices risk increase. 
In that purpose, we multiplied the standard deviation of each contract-specific crop price by 
an expansion factor (E). If E equals 1, it corresponds to the baseline scenario with a low 
empirical  standard  deviation.  A  value  of  2  or  3  corresponds  respectively  to  a  standard 
deviation  multiplied  by  2  or  3.  Here,  for  each  simulation,  the  expansion  factor  of  each 
contract specific crop price is identical. Furthermore, the level of risk aversion is based on the 
value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (r) which is used in the objective function. 
The higher the coefficient is, the higher the level of risk aversion. With a coefficient equals to 
zero, the farmer is risk neutral. A value between 0 and 1 corresponds to a farmer hardly risk 
averse.  A  value  of  1.5  correspond  to  a  normal  risk  averse  farmer  and  a  value  of  2.5 
correspond to a farmer highly risk averse (Hardaker et al., 2004).  
We observe that it is optimal to a risk neutral or hardly risk averse farmer (r < 1) to cultivate 
the total area using the integrated technique. When r increases, the percentage of conventional 
technique adopted increases. The switch from integrated to conventional technique is first 
made on the durum wheat. We also observe that risk aversion modifies crop mix and not only 
the SCR. With an increasing risk aversion, a preference for crop diversification appears. Thus 
sunflower and dry corn appears in the crop mix to partially replace rapeseed, and the durum 
wheat is partially replaced by soft wheat much less risky. 
Impacts of price risk increases (E=2; E=3) on SCR are significant for a coefficient of risk 
aversion greater than 1.5. Nevertheless, for a less risk averse farmer, even if price risk does 
not change the SCR, the crop mix is modified. This result shows that  hardly  risk averse 
farmers can manage partially price risk with production adjustments without any change on 
farming practices. 
5.2 case 2: all the marketing contracts are available 
In this set of simulation, all the marketing contracts are available to the farmer. Thus, the 
farmer can define here a marketing strategy in order to cope with price risk. To assess the 
impact of an increasing commodity prices volatility on production adjustments when all the 
price alternatives are proposed to the farmer, we also used an expansion factor that multiplies 
standard deviation by 2 and 3. The farmer faces choices on both productive and marketing 
sides. We show the results for a farmer with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equals to 1.5 (table 5). From the previous results (where only contracts K2 are available to the farmer) 
we have noticed that the farmer has a SCR equals to 92.7 % under the baseline scenario (E=1) 
but decrease sharply with the increasing price risk. Here, under the baseline scenario, the SCR 
equals 82.5 which is close to the previous result. We also observe that the crop plan selected 
is  really  close  to  a  farmer  hardly  risk  averse  when  only  K2  is  available.  This  result  is 
explained by the fact that the farmer sells a part of the harvested quantities under one of the 
two forward contracts K3A or K3B (43% of the durum wheat, 14% of the corn and 57% of 
the sunflower). The choice to hedge a part of the grain strategy allows him to take more risk 
on the productive side of his farm and then to behave as a less risk averse farmer. We also 
observe a decrease of the crop diversification. 
The simulation of an increase of the price volatility (E=2 and E=3) gives a SCR equals 100% 
(E=2) and 39% (E=3). With only K2 available, we have seen that the SCR drops to zero. This 
result indicates that the risk averse farmer get a larger capacity to cultivate under integrating 
farming  practices  when  all  contracts  are  available.  It  also  shows  how  much  farming 
management and pricing arrangements offer to farmers are actually linked for risk averse 
farmers.  
If we look at the marketing decisions selected by the farmer when price risk increase (table 5), 
we first note that K1 contract, which corresponds to an average price, is selected only when 
price volatility increase. Moreover, the proportion of the production hedged also increase. 
6.  Conclusion 
Farmers  become  exposed  to  greater  volatile  world  commodity  prices  compared  to  earlier 
years that lead to an increasing overall risk in the farm business. The model described in this 
paper has the objective to study and to assess farmer’s reactions to price risk increases on both 
marketing and production choices. To adequately investigate this objective, we introduce in 
the model the main pricing arrangements available to a representative crop farmer of the 
Midi-Pyrénées area. Marketing alternatives are characterized by an average price, a standard 
deviation and date(s) of payment. Thus, contract selected by the farmer are potentially based 
on risk aversion and risk content consideration but also on cash constraints consideration. 
Furthermore, the model also distinguishes states of nature of yield and states of nature of 
price, which contribute to a better appraisal of the effects of each sources of risk on decisions 
and farm outcomes. Sensitivity analysis performed show that contracts can help farmers to cope  with  price  risk  and  that  it  act  upon  production  adjustments.  Thus,  performance  of 
different selling strategies should not be evaluated apart from production decisions. 
Nevertheless,  we  do  not  make  use  of  the  full  model’s  capacity  to  study  links  between 
marketing and production decisions. First, the effects of liquidity constraint, CAP instrument 
changes and farmer expectations in terms of correlation between crop yield and price need to 
be investigated. Second, as mentioned in the brief literature review, a few farmers use forward 
contracts. Further analysis could help to better understand key factors explaining the low level 
of adoption and incidences on production choices. 
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   Table 1: method used to compute contract-specific crop prices and standard deviation 
 
contract    
K1  Average  of  the  monthly  crop  price  prevailing 
during the campaign 
K2  Average  price  prevailing  the  month  of  the 
harvest 
K3A  and 
K3B 
Average price prevailing  the hedging month – 
transaction cost 
K4A  and 
K4B 
Average price prevailing during the sales’ month 
 
 
   Table 2: variable costs, average yield and yield risk per crop activity 
 
  Soft wheat  Durum wheat  Irrigated corn  Dry corn  sunflower  rapeseed 
  Conv   int  Conv   int  Conv   int  Conv   int  Conv   int  Conv   int 
Variable 
costs (€) 
440  349  522  391  817  776  606  565  337  318  535  458 
Average 
yield (LT1) 
6.2  5.6  4.9  4.4      6  6  2.4  2.4  3.2  3.2 
Average 
yield (LT2) 
5.7  5.1  4.4  3.9  10.5   10.5      2.2  2.2  3.2  3.2 
CV on LT1  9.6  19  14.7  27.2      16.6  24.6  18.7  20.4  11.5  28.1 
CV on LT2  10.5  21  16.3  30.3  5.9  10.4      20.4  31.8  11.5  28.1 
Conv= conventional technique; Int=integrated technique; yield are given in tons/ha ; CV= 
coefficient of variation of the crop yield ; LT1= land type 1 (clay muddy soil) ; LT2=land 
type 2 (sandy-clay muddy soil and irrigated land when equipped of irrigation) 
 
   Table 3: contract-specific average crop prices and coefficient of variation 
  K1  K2  K3A  K3B  K4A  K4B 
Price:             
Soft wheat  130  122  132  127  135  131 
Durum wheat  178  175  177  174  185  177 
Corn  139  132  150  135  140  139 
Sunflower  265  251  267  256  272  270 
rapeseed  255  240  268  253  263  255 
CV:             
Soft wheat  9.4  8.6  0  0  11.2  10.7 
Durum wheat  9.5  9.9  0  0  10.5  10.7 
Corn  7.2  9.4  0  0  10.5  10.7 
Sunflower  10.8  8.2  0  0  15.2  16.6 
rapeseed  10.5  9  0  0  10.9  14.3 
CV = coefficient of variation of the contract-specific crop price 
 




0  0.9  1.1  1.5  2.5 
Expansion factor  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3 
Expected profit (€)  149684  145350  142308  149684  145345  142251  149684  145343  142245  36068  30032  24162  8646  8513  8313 
conventional (ha)   0    0    0    0    0   0  0  0  0  7.3  91.1  100  82  92.6  100 
integrated (ha)  100   100   100    100    100   100   100  100  100  92.7  8.9  0  18  7.4  0 




100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  92.7  8.9  0  18  7.4  0 
optimal cropping 
plan (ha): 
                                      
conventional: 
         
Durum wheat                             7.3  45.6  52.4  3.9  26.9  49.2 
Soft wheat                                      38.1  18.7    
Irrigated corn                                15.1  24  24  24  24 
Dry corn                                28  14  7.2  11  15 
Sunflower                                2.4  9.6  9.3     10.5 
rapeseed                                         12  1.3 
integrated: 
         
Durum wheat  57  57  57  57  57  57  57  57  57  39.1                
Soft wheat                                      3.6       
Irrigated corn  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  8.9             
Dry corn                             28                
Sunflower        9     1.4  9.1     1.8  9.2              7.4    
rapeseed  19  19  10  19  17.6  9.9  19  17.2  9.8  1.6        13.9       Table 5: model outputs when all contracts are available 
 
 
expansion factor (E)  1 (baseline)  2  3 
expected profit (€)  136717  144655  112473 
conventional (ha)  17.5  0  61 
integrated (ha)  82.5  100  39 
simulated conversion rate 
(SCR) (%) 
82.5  100  39 
optimal cropping plan (ha): 
conventional: 
soft wheat        30.6 
sunflower  17.5       
rapeseed        30.4 
integrated: 
durum wheat  57  57  15 
irrigated corn  24  24  24 
sunflower  1.5  19    
optimal contractual choices (%): 
   Year 1  year 2  year 1  year 2  year 1  year 2 
durum wheat                   
K1                 0.14                 0.29                 0.14                 0.14       
K2                 0.14                    0.14          
K3A              0.43                 0.57                 0.14                 0.71                 0.57                 0.29    
K3B                             0.71    
K4A              0.57                   
K4B                    0.57                    0.29       
soft wheat :                   
K1                          0.14                 0.14    
K2                             0.14    
K3A                          0.29                 0.57    
K3B                          0.71       
K4A                             0.14    
corn:                   
K1              0.14                    0.14                 0.14                 0.29       
K2              0.29                 1.00                 0.43                 0.86                 0.14                 0.71    
K3A                   
K3B              0.14                    0.29                    0.43                 0.29    
K4A              0.43                   
K4B                    0.14                    0.14       
sunflower:                   
K1                   
K2              0.14                 0.14                 0.14             
K3A              0.57                 0.86                 0.71                 1.00          
K3B                    0.14             
K4B              0.29                   
rapeseed:                   
K1                          0.29                 0.14    
K2                          0.14       
K3A                          0.43                 0.14    
K3B                             0.71    
K4B                          0.14       